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The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a goal 
embedded in the ILO Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and
1 
which has now been widely adopted by the international community. 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach the goal, the ILO 
pursues  a  Decent  Work  Agenda  which  comprises  four  interrelated  areas:  Respect  for 
fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, employment promotion, 
social protection and social dialogue. Explanations of this integrated approach and related 
challenges are contained in a number of key documents: in those explaining and elaborating 
the concept of decent work
2, in the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), and in 
the Global Employment Agenda. 
The  Global  Employment  Agenda  was  developed  by  the  ILO  through  tripartite 
consensus of its Governing Body’s Employment and Social Policy Committee. Since its 
adoption in 2003 it has been further articulated and made more operational and today it 
constitutes the basic framework through which the ILO pursues the objective of placing 
employment at the centre of economic and social policies.
3 
The  Employment  Sector  is  fully  engaged  in  the  implementation  of  the  Global 
Employment  Agenda,  and  is  doing  so  through  a  large  range  of  technical  support  and 
capacity building activities, advisory services and policy research. As part of its research 
and  publications  programme,  the  Employment  Sector  promotes  knowledge-generation 
around  key  policy  issues  and  topics  conforming  to  the  core  elements  of  the  Global 
Employment Agenda and the Decent Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of 
books, monographs, working papers, employment reports and policy briefs.
4 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main findings 
of  research  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  various  departments  and  programmes  of  the 
Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange of ideas and to stimulate 
debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the ILO. 
 
 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf 
2 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference: Decent 
work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (2001); Working out of poverty 
(2003). 
3 See  http://www.ilo.org/gea.  And  in  particular:  Implementing  the  Global  Employment  Agenda: 
Employment strategies in support of decent work, “Vision” document, ILO, 2006. 
4 See http://www.ilo.org/employment. 
  José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs 
Executive Director 




The landscape of development is changing for all countries as a result of the impact of 
the global financial crisis, and in this context policy discussions in developing countries 
are increasingly focusing on optimizing policy responses.  
 
Policy  responses  are  included  within,  and  also  influence  the  shape  of  national 
Development Frameworks. In this regard, ILO has intensified its engagement in  National 
Development Frameworks, including Poverty Reduction Strategies since 2001. Originally 
this was in response to limited participation of the ILO tripartite partners in the formulation 
process of these frameworks, and the limited emphasis laid on employment and decent 
work in the goals, strategies and budget allocations in many countries. More recently it has 
been also in relation to the crisis and the capacity for response. In fact, many countries are 
re-thinking their approaches in light of the impact of the financial crisis, and are seeking to 
clarify the range of policy options which can intensify employment outcomes as well as 
reduce poverty.  
 
In doing this ILO has developed a practical approach applied to a varying degree in 
39  countries  across  the  globe.  This  approach  has  consisted  of  (i)  engaging  in  policy 
discussion (ii) empowering constituents (separately and together) to better influence the 
drafting,  implementation  and  monitoring  of  national  frameworks  and  (iv)  maintaining 
critical  dialogue  at  national  and  international  levels  for  making  employment  a  central 
concern of the national development. The application of this approach is backed by a range 
of tools and analytic papers connecting the Decent Work Agenda with the PRS framework.  
 
Improvement  in  tripartite  participation  has  been  evident  although  the  process  of 
capacity building continues. As part of this capacity building, a seminar, Decent Work 
Issues in Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) and National Development Frameworks, 
was organized in Turin to consider priorities for the way forward. 
 
This  paper,  first  presented  at  the  above  mentioned  seminar,  is  an  important 
contribution to the new thinking and priorities on the role of monetary and fiscal policies, 
and their impact on employment and poverty reduction  
 
We would like to thanks Professor Gerald Epstein for this thought provoking paper 
and the presentation ansd discussion that he led at the Turin workshop. 
 
This paper provides important ideas about the wide range of policy options available 
for adaptation to specific country contexts. It is a milestone in re-thinking the monetary 
and fiscal policy landscape, the role of the State and of the Central Banks in maximizing 
the employment impact of various policy instruments. 
 
Azita Berar Awad 
Director 









This Working Paper was first presented to a workshop organized by the Employment 
Policy department of the International Labour Organisation in December 2008 focused on 
Decent Work Issues in Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) and National Development 
Frameworks. It formed part of a series of analytical presentations on making employment 
central in national development frameworks. 
 
I would like to thank Mr. Jose Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs and Azita Berar Awad of 
ILO for their  extensive and excellent comments on the first draft of this paper, and to 
Alana Albee and Graeme Buckley for reviewing subsequent drafts. Many thanks go also to 
my colleagues Ilene Grabel, James Heintz, Jomo, K.S., Leonce Ndikumana, Robert Pollin  
and Erinc Yeldan who have co-authored the papers or co-organized the projects on which 
most  of  the  work  presented  here  is  based.  Of  course,  I  alone  am  responsible  for  the 
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As  the  world  financial  crisis  deepens  and  spreads  to  the  real  economy  in  more 
countries  around  the  globe,  many  societies  in  the  developing  world  that  were  already 
experiencing high levels of poverty and underemployment are now threatened to an even 
greater extent. The World Bank has estimated that the increased prices of food and fuel in 
the first half of 2008 have driven 100 million more people into poverty, world wide. And, 
now,  with  the  global  economic  crisis  spreading,  the  situation  for  poor  people  in  the 
developing world could become much, much worse. In its January, 2009 forecast, the IMF 
predicted that World economic growth in 2009 would be only  ½ percent, the lowest level 
since  World  War  II,  and  turning  negative  if  measured  at  market  exchange  rates. 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/01/pdf/0109.pdf    )  The  ILO 
Employment Trends Report, issued in January, 2009, warns that: "global unemployment in 
2009 could increase over 2007 by a range of 18 million to 30 million workers, and more 
than 50 million if the situation continues to deteriorate….in this last scenario some 200 




In  this  environment,  the  task  of  generating  substantially  higher  levels  of  decent 
employment has taken on more urgency, yet now faces even more obstacles then before. Of 
course, a key component of the solution to the current crisis will be massive expansionary 
fiscal actions on the part of the rich countries, preferably in a coordinated fashion, but 
individually if necessary. More aid and support from the rich countries and international 
institutions to the developing world will also be necessary to avoid a very serious, negative 
shock for the world's poorest and most vulnerable. In the short and medium run, as before 
the  recent  crisis,  the  key  will  be  to  generate  large  scale  increases  in  decent  work  if 
developing countries and the world are to avoid a downward spiral into depression. 
 
But  what  macroeconomic policy  frameworks  should  be  used to  design  policies  to 
address this crises both in the short and in the medium terms? There seems little doubt that 
the conventional wisdom on macroeconomic and financial policy that has been promoted 
by  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  World  Bank,  many  Central  Banks,  Ministries  of  
Finance, Treasuries and many economists around the globe for the past twenty-five years 
has now been shown to be profoundly flawed, if not totally discredited. This "neo-liberal" 
approach  –the  so-called  "Washington  Consensus"  and  its  cousins  --  that  has  promoted 
wide-spread  financial  de-regulation,  elimination  of  capital  controls  and  other  capital 
management techniques, the obsession with  attracting foreign capital no matter how short 
term or speculative, and inflation-targeting central bank policy that has focused on limiting 
commodity  inflation  to  the  low  single  digits  while  ignoring  asset  price  inflation  and 
employment creation, has not only been inadequate to solving the financial problems we 
face, but, very likely, were major contributors, if not the cause, of the financial crisis that 
the world is  now confronting. Yet, despite the widespread loss of confidence in this model 
of macroeconomic management, many of the same institutions and economists are calling 
for a two track system: Non-orthodox policies of nationalization/bail-out, loose monetary 
policy and fiscal stimulus for the rich countries, and more of the same neo-liberal policies 
for the poorer countries.  
 
What  is  clear  is  that  to  design  and  carry  out  these  employment-oriented 
macroeconomic policies, the old orthodoxy must be abandoned, and policy makers must 
look for other policy frameworks to inform their macroeconomic and financial policies. 
Fortunately,  these  other  frameworks  and  policies  do  exist,  have  been  used  by  many 
successful countries for many years, and can be adapted to the current environment in many 
counties.  Of  course,  they  must  be  re-designed  and  made  appropriate  to  the  particular 
countries and issues involved. Among other factors, it is important to ensure that these  
2 
policies  are  designed  to  an  appropriate  level  of  economic  development  faced  by  each 
country. The main point, though, is that, on the whole, these policies and frameworks do 
not need to be invented whole cloth.  
 
In this paper I  summarize employment oriented macroeconomic and financial policies 
that  governments  in  developing  countries  can  adopt  to  help  promote  more  and  better 
employment as a key to reducing poverty over the medium to long run.
5 This paper is a 
companion paper to that of my colleague James Heintz (2008) who focuses primarily on 
informal  employment.
6  In  this  paper,  I  will  present  policies  within  a  more  general 
framework which, in the case of informal employment issues,  may need to be focused and 
adapted in the ways that James Heintz has described. Here I will focus on policies in three 
main  areas:  first, this  paper  will  address  issues  of monetary  policy.  After  presenting  a 
critique  of  orthodox  "inflation-targeting"  monetary  policy,  I  will  describe  concrete 
alternatives,  based  on  a  project  conducted  with  an    international  team  of  economists, 
designed to help promote descent employment and poverty reduction.
7 Next I will turn to 
financial  structure  and  policy  and  describe  concrete  alternative  financial  policies  and 
structures  that  can  help  promote  better  credit  access  for  small  businesses  and  poor 
households, and more employment generating investment. Finally, I discuss policies for 
managing capital flows and exchange rates to help generate more and better employment. 
In addition, these policies, like those concerning the financial sector, will also help maintain 
financial stability, and avoid the kinds of financial meltdowns we have been witnessing in 
recent years, first in the developing countries, and now in the developed ones. 
 
Before  describing  specific  alternatives,  we  have  to  clarify  what  we  mean  by  pro-
employment  and  poverty  reducing    financial  and  macroeconomic  policies.    We  will 
describe policies and institutions that are designed to maintain aggregate demand,  mobilize 
and  channel  savings,  allocate  credit  in  accordance  with  identified  social  and  economic 
objectives, and promote financial and macroeconomic stability with the goal of promoting 
growth that will generate employment, income and wealth for the majority, including the 
poor. 
 
With these general principles in mind, we can now move on to our discussion of the 
three specific policy areas: 1) Monetary Policy 2) Financial Policy and 3) Exchange rate 
policy and the management of capital flows. 
2 Monetary Policy 
2.1 Orthodox Policy: Inflation Targeting by central 
banks 
 
Despite the massive challenges facing the unemployed, underemployed and the poor,  
for the past decade or more, so-called "global best practice" approach to central banking has 
not focused on economic growth or employment generation; instead, it has  pursued formal 
or informal "inflation-targeting", in which keeping a low rate of inflation – in the low single 
digits – has been proposed as the dominant and often exclusive target of monetary policy. 
 
 
5 This paper draws liberally from my work and the work of my colleagues. See Epstein (2000), 
Epstein and Grabel (2006), Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003) Heintz, (2008), Pollin, et. al. (2006), 
Pollin et. al. (2008).  
6 James Heintz, "Employment, Poverty, and Economic Policy in the Context of Widespread 
Informality", Paper Presented to the ILO, Turin, December, 2008. 
7  Most of the papers from this project are published in a special issue of the International Review of 
Applied Economics, March, 2008, edited by Gerald Epstein and Erinc Yeldan.  
3 
In this inflation-focused monetary policy, other important  goals, such as financial stability, 
rapid economic growth and employment creation, are seen as inappropriate direct targets of 
central bank policy; rather  they are viewed as hoped for – even presumed – by-products  of 
an inflation focused approach to monetary policy.  (IMF, 2006). Thus, according to  this 
orthodox approach to monetary policy, the focus of policy is on "stabilization", rather than 
"growth"  or  "development",  with  an  implicit  assumption  that  once  "stabilization"  is 
achieved, economic growth, employment creation, and poverty reduction will follow. 
 
This orthodox view not only specifies the appropriate target of monetary policy, but 
also the appropriate tools or instruments.  The orthodox approach has emphasized indirect, 
market based instruments of policy, such as short term interest rates, as the primary and 
often exclusive tool of monetary policy. This is in contrast to the 'direct', quantitative tools 
often used by central banks which have involved credit allocation methods, interest rate 
ceilings, and other ways to direct credit to priority economic sectors and goals. In short, the 
orthodox approach has narrowed both the goals and the tools of monetary policy. 
 
After  more  than  a  decade  of  experience  with  this  inflation-focused,  market  based 
approach,  the  policy  record  has  been  rather  disappointing,  even  disastrous  for  many 
countries.  In  a  number  of  countries,  inflation  has  come  down,  to  be  sure,  but  it  is 
questionable  to what extent the drop in inflation is due to changes in domestic monetary 
policy, rather than the overall global fall in inflation (Ball and Sheridan, 2003). But even if 
domestic monetary policy has reduced inflation, the hoped for gains in employment have, 
generally, NOT materialized; and, for many countries following this orthodox approach, 
economic growth has not significantly increased. And this assessment does not even take 
into account the disastrous impact of the global economic crisis of 2007 - ?, that, arguably, 
are exacerbated, if not caused, by some of these same policies. The key point, then, is this: 
despite  what  the  orthodox  approach  maintains,  employment  generation  and  economic 
growth, are NOT automatic by-products of "stabilization-focused" central bank policy.  
 
While it might seem obvious that stabilization focused central bank policy  represents 
the only proper role for central banks, in fact, looking at history casts serious doubt on this 
claim. Far from being the historical norm, this focus by central banks on stabilization to the 
exclusion of development represents a sharp break from historical practice, not just in the 
developing world but also in the now developed countries as well (Epstein, 2007a). In 
many  of  the  successful  currently  developed  countries,  as  well  as  in  many  developing 
countries in the post-Second World War period,  development was seen as a crucial part of 
the central bank's tasks. Now, by contrast, development has dropped off the "to do" list of 
central banks in most developing countries 
 
As the world digs itself out of this economic crises and establishes a new macro-
economic framework, there should be a return to the historical norm of central bank policy: 
in  particular,  employment  creation,  financial  stability  and  more  rapid  economic  growth 
should join inflation and stabilization more generally as key goals of central bank policy. 
Of course, we do NOT argue that maintaining a moderate inflation rate is unimportant. 
Indeed, historically, some central banks went much too far in downplaying this stabilization 
role,  sometimes  with  disastrous  consequences:  a  prominent  example  is  Zaire,  which 
experienced  numerous  periods  of  disruptively  high  inflation  (Honohan  and  O'Connell, 
1997). But this does not mean that the optimal policy is to go to the other extreme and 
ignore  the  developmental  role  entirely.  Balancing  between  the  stabilization  and 
developmental roles is both desirable and feasible for many central banks. Some of the 
policies undertaken by developmentally oriented central banks in the 1950's – 1970's were 
misguided or ill-executed: Ghana in the 1950's and 1960's is one example. (Honohan and 
O'Connell, 1997). Still, we can learn important lessons from their experiences and utilize 
them to re-orient central bank policy in relevant countries to a greater focus on employment 
creation as a desirable goal of monetary policy.  
  
4 
Of course, central banks need not, and indeed, cannot be the only institution having an 
employment generation role. Fiscal policy, industrial policy, labor policy and others must 
play  a  crucial  role  as  well.  But,  in  most  developing  countries,  central  banks  need  to 
cooperate with other institutions by doing much more than simply keeping inflation rates in 
the low single digits. To bring this about, many institutions will have to get involved. 
Among them is the IMF, which has been enshrining inflation control as a dominant policy. 
The IMF should change its advice to a more balanced position between inflation control 
and employment generation and poverty reduction. 
 
2.2 A Critique of Inflation Targeting  
 
Before  discussing  more  employment  friendly    approaches  to  macroeconomic  and 
monetary policy, it will be helpful to briefly discusses the problems with the now dominant 
approach – namely inflation targeting. 
 
According  to  its  advocates,  "full  fledged"  inflation  targeting  consists  of  five 
components: absence of other nominal anchors, such as exchange rates or nominal GDP; an 
institutional  commitment  to  price  stability;  absence  of  fiscal  dominance;  policy 
(instrument)  independence;  and  policy  transparency  and  accountability.  (Mishkin  and  
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p. 3; Bernanke, et. al. 1999). In practice, while few central banks 
reach  the  "ideal"  of  being  "full  fledged"  inflation  targeters,  many  others  still  focus  on 
fighting inflation to the virtual exclusion of other goals. The overriding announced goal of 
inflation  targeting  central  banks  is  typically  “price  stability”,  usually  defined  to  be  an 
inflation rate in the low single digits. (Ibid., p. 99). In addition, inflation targeting is usually 
associated with changes in the law that enhance the independence of the central bank (Ibid., 
p. 102; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p. 8). As we see below, this relatively rigid 
commitment to a very low inflation rate can lead to monetary policy that is too restrictive, 
leading to excessively high real interest rates, sub-optimal growth of GDP and employment, 
and an over-valued exchange rare rate. 
 
The major claims made by advocates of inflation targeting is that it will: 
￿  Reduce the rate of inflation 
￿  Enhance the credibility of monetary policy 
￿  Reduce the sacrifice ratio associated with contractionary monetary policy 
￿  Help attract foreign investment and encourage domestic investment 
 
The evidence on these claims is mainly in the negative. It is true that countries that 
adopt inflation targeting often achieve lower inflation rates. But there is strong evidence 
that this decline in inflation might not be due to inflation targeting itself, but rather to the 
general declines in world-wide inflation pressures, (due for example, to major increases of 
the global labor and increases in global production capacity due to extraordinary export-
oriented growth in China and the fall of the Berlin Wall) or to a simple reversion to a more 
normal inflation rate (Ball and Sheridan, 2003; for a contrary view, though, see IMF 2006). 
In addition, most evidence indicates that inflation targeting central banks do not reduce 
inflation at any lower cost than other countries' central banks  in terms of forgone output. 
That is, inflation targeting does not appear to increase the credibility of central bank policy 
and therefore, does not appear to reduce the sacrifice ratio. (See Bernanke, et. al, 1999 and 
Epstein, 2000, for detailed surveys of the literature). Typically, central banks that reduce 
inflation do so the old-fashioned way: by raising interest rates, causing recessions or slow 
growth, and contributing to job loss.
  Moreover, there is no evidence that countries adopting 
inflation targeting manage to attract more  foreign investment.
 
 
2.3 Why the Focus on Inflation? 
 
There is a further, basic problem with inflation targeting and the neo-liberal approach 
to central bank policy more generally. Why is there such a focus on fighting inflation to the  
5 
exclusion of other goals? And even if fighting inflation is important, as we agree it is, why 
pick a target in the low single digits? As reported in Bruno and Easterly (1996) and Epstein 
(2000) there is a great deal of evidence that moderate rates of inflation, inflation up to 20% 
or more, has no predictable negative consequences on the real economy: it is not associated 
with  slower  growth,  reduced  investment,  less  foreign  direct  investment,  or  any  other 
important real variable that one can find. (Also see Pollin and Zhu, 2006). Some types of 
price  increases,  usually    associated  with  "supply  shock"  inflation  –  especially  those 
involving price increases for basic necessities, can have very serious negative consequences 
for the poor. But in this case, it is not clear that restrictive monetary policy is the best 
response.  Acquiring  more  supply  of  the  commodity  "in  shock"  would  generally  be  a 
preferable policy response.  
 
Apart  from  growth  effects,  however,  many  economists  have  argued  that  inflation 
harms the poor more than the rich. Hence, on distribution grounds, inflation reduction into 
the  low  single  digits  should  be  a  priority.  While  more  research  is  necessary  to  fully 
investigate this claim, important recent work by Jayadev calls this conventional wisdom 
into question (Jayadev 2006,  2008) by showing that in a sample of richer and middle 
income  developing  countries,  poorer  and  working  class  people  prefer  the  government 
reduce unemployment than fight inflation. Only the wealthier people prefer that inflation 
fighting take precedence over lowering unemployment. 
 
In addition to these concerns, Braunstein and Heintz (2008) find that disinflationary 
monetary policy in developing countries, like that undertaken in connection with inflation-
focused monetary policy regimes, has a disproportionately negative employment effect on 
women, relative to men. Braunstein and Heintz conjecture that this might be due either to 
the sectors which tight monetary policy harm most directly. For example perhaps export 
sectors  employ  a  higher  ratio  of  women,  and  they  are  hurt  disproportionately  by  tight 
monetary policy which raises interest rates, attracts foreign capital and leads to an over-
valuation of the real exchange rate. Another possibility is that, because of discrimination, 
women are "first fired" in a recession. Both of these are just conjectures, however, and this 
empirical finding calls out for further explanatory research. Still, Braunstein and Heintz's 
excellent work is highly suggestive that there may be important gender effects of monetary 
policy, suggesting that this area needs much more research than it is currently receiving. 
 
Of course, all agree that very high levels of inflation, above 40%, can have every 
serious impacts on growth and possibly the distribution of income. Even inflation above 
20% can create  problems,  according  to recent  data.  But there appears  to  be very  little 
justification for monetary policy oriented toward keeping inflation in the low single digits, 
especially when employment and poverty are significant problems.  
 
Still, it is important to recognize that some types of inflation unambiguously hurts the 
poor. Cost-push or supply side inflation of basic necessities, such as food, oil, and other 
basic supplies, can have devastating impacts on the poor. This type of inflation, in fact, is 
often the dominant type of inflation in most developing countries. However, it is unlikely 
that tight monetary policy, in and of itself, is the best response to this type of inflation. 
Efforts to increase supply, while controlling costs and subsidizing the consumption of the 
most vulnerable, perhaps by basic income grants, is often the best response to this inflation. 
Of course, it is important to take care that such supply-shock inflation does not lead to a 
cost-push price spiral that gets out of control. Monetary policy does have an important role 
to play in preventing such an inflation spiral getting our of control. 
 
2.4 Inflation Targeting and IMF Financial Programming 
 
The  problems  associated  with  inflation  targeting  are  exacerbated  when  they  are 
combined with the standard restrictions the IMF imposes on borrowing countries' monetary 
policy. These standard restrictions are called financial programming.  
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The IMF financial programming approach has been subject to a number of significant 
criticisms (Epstein and Heintz, 2006; Easterly, 2004; Blejer et al., 2002). Easterly (2004) 
shows  that  there  is  significant  empirical  slippage  in  virtually  every  stage  of  the 
programming analysis, so that hitting ultimate targets becomes extremely problematic. As a 
result, the framework either routinely produces wrong results, or must be supplemented by 
other analyses that are not part of the programming framework. Partly as a result, the IMF 
has  recently  been  imposing  (or  strongly  recommending)  additional  targets,  especially 
inflation targets (IT). Blejer et al. (2002) argue that inflation targets are redundant and 
sometimes inconsistent with the other IMF programming targets; Epstein and Heintz (2006) 
show  that  inflation  targets  enforce  a  contractionary  bias  on  the  regular  programming 
targets, making it less likely that the central bank will accommodate economic growth and 
credit creation when desirable. Table 1 is reproduced from the Epstein and Heintz (2006) 
paper. In the traditional financial programming exercise, the main targets are net domestic 
assets ceilings (NDA, sometimes called “domestic credit ceilings”) which limit the amount 
of credit that the Central Bank can create, and the net international reserves floor (NIR), 
which  require  that  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  are  set  to  maintain  a  minimum  level  of 
international reserves. If either target is threatened – that is, if international reserves are too 
low or if net domestic assets are too high – then the program calls for tightening monetary 
policy,  raising  the  target  interest  rate,  cutting  down  on  credit  to  the  government  and 
banking sector, and/or raising reserve requirements. 
 
A  key  and  troubling  implication  of  this  approach  is  that  there  is  no  clear  set  of 
conditions under which expansionary monetary or credit policies are called for, even in a 
situation  of  slow  growth. Even  if both  targets  are met,  programming  does  not  call for 
expansionary  policy.  This  is  largely  because  there  is  no  explicit  operational  target  for 
economic growth, employment creation, or poverty reduction. This could also reflect a 
priority  placed  on  accumulating  foreign  exchange  reserves  over  other  goals,  such  as 
achieving more employment. In any case, the bias of financial programming is therefore 
contractionary. 
 
Table 1 IMF Financial programming based on net domestic assets  
ceilings and net international reserves floors 
  Net Domestic Assets (NDA) 
Higher Than Programmed 
(Threatened) 






Higher Than Programmed 
(Not Threatened) 
Only the NIR target has 
been met.  
Policy: tighten 
Both targets have been 
met. 
Policy: No need for 
tightening 
Lower Than Programmed 
(Threatened) 
Neither target has been 
met.  
Policy: tighten 
NIR has not been met. 
Policy: tighten 
Source: Epstein and Heintz (2006), adapted from Blejer et al. (2002), Table 1 
 
If explicit inflation targets are added to the traditional financial programming exercise, 
then this bias becomes even worse, especially in a situation of supply-side inflation shocks. 
An inflation ceiling  essentially adds an additional restriction on policy. Table 2 adapted 
from Blejer et al. (2002), illustrates this point.  For example, in the situation where the NIR 
floor is met and NDA ceiling is met, but, say, because of a supply shock, the inflation target 
is not met, this approach would call for restrictive policy. Again, there is no situation which 
explicitly calls for looser policy because, as before, growth or employment generation does 





Table 2 Financial programming with net domestic assets, net  
international reserves, and inflation targets 
  Inflation Target (IT) 
Higher Than Programmed 
(Threatened) 
Lower Than Programmed 
(Not Threatened) 
Net Domestic Assets 
(NDA) Relative to 
Program 
Requirements 
Higher Than Programmed 
(Threatened) 
NDA and IT give the same 
signal. 
Policy: tighten 
NDA and IT give different 
signals. (NDA – tighten; IT 
– don't tighten. 
Policy: tighten 
Lower Than Programmed 
(Not Threatened) 
NDA and IT give different 
signals: IT – tighten; NDA – 
no tightening needed. 
Policy: tighten 
NDA and IT give the same 
signal. 
Policy: No tightening 
needed. 
Source: Epstein and Heintz (2006), adapted from Blejer et al. (2002), Table 2 
 
None of this is meant to imply that maintaining a moderate and stable inflation rate is 
unimportant; nor are we arguing that the macroeconomic authorities can ignore supply-side 
inflation.  But  it  does  suggest  that  unless  economic  growth  targets  are  explicitly 
incorporated into the making of macroeconomic policy, there will be a bias against growth 
and  employment  in  IMF  financial  programming  and  as  a  result  in  recipient  countries 
formulation of policy as it is currently structured. 
 
2.5 Alternatives to Inflation Targeting 
 
Fortunately, there are alternatives to inflation targeting that hold out the promise of a 
more  employment  friendly  monetary  policy  and  that  can  be  tailored  to  the  particular 
circumstances  and  needs  of  different  countries.  These  were  developed  by  a  team  of 
researchers working on a PERI/Bilkent project on alternatives to inflation targeting, as well 
as  a  United  Nations  Development  Project  (UNDP)  sponsored  study  of  employment 
targeting economic policy for South Africa.
8 The countries covered in PERI/Bilkent project 
are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, The Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, and Viet Nam. 
As will be illustrated by these studies, one size does NOT fit all. A range of alternatives 
were developed in these papers, from modest changes in the inflation targeting framework 
to allow for more focus on exchange rates and a change in the index of inflation used, to a 
much  broader  change  in  the  overall  mandate  of  the  central  bank  towards  employment 
targeting, rather than inflation targeting. (See Table 3 below for a summary). Some of the 
alternative policies focus exclusively on changes in central bank policy, while for other 
countries,  changes  in  the  broad  policy  framework  and  in  the  interactions  of  monetary, 
financial and fiscal policy are proposed. Some incorporate explicit goals and targets, while 
others prefer more flexibility and somewhat less transparency. But all of the studies agreed 
that  the  responsibilities  of  central  banks,  particularly  in  developing  countries,  while 
including maintaining a moderate rate of inflation, must be broader than that, and should 
include other crucial "real" variables that have a direct impact on employment, poverty and 
economic growth, such as the real exchange rate, employment, or investment.
9 They also 
 
 
8 The project was directed by Gerald Epstein of the University of Massachusetts and Erinc Yeldan of 
Bilkent  University,  Ankara,  Turkey.  For  the  published  papers  of  the  PERI/Bilkent  project  see 
Epstein and Yeldan, eds. 2009. The PERI/Bilkent Project  was  made possible  with the generous 
support of Ford Foundation, Rockefellar Brothers Fund, UN-DESA and other funders. 
9 It is true that so-called "Taylor Rules" that estimate policy rules governing monetary policy often 
find  that  central  banks  react  to  the  deviation  between  "potential  output"  and  actual  output  (the 




agree that in many cases, central banks must broaden their available  policy tools to allow 
them  to  reach  multiple  goals,  including,  if  necessary,  the  implementation  of  capital 
management techniques (Ocampo, 2002; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2006). 
 
2.6 Real Targeting 
  
The employment targeting approach is an example of a real targeting framework. A 
real targeting framework for monetary policy adds one or more important real variables, 
such as real GDP growth, or a stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER), or "full 
employment", to nominal variables, such as the rate of inflation, as a goal of monetary 
policy. The so-called Humphrey-Hawkins law in the United States, which commits  the 
U.S.  Federal  Reserve  (FED)  to  maintaining  both  "price  stability"  and  "high  levels  of 
employment" is an example of a real targeting framework, though, admittedly a fairly 
weak  one  in  that  it  does  not  specify  exactly  the  meaning  of  "price  stability"  or  "high 
employment". 
 
A real targeting framework has a number of important advantages.  
1.  First and foremost, it places front and centre the economic variables that have the most 
immediate and clearest association with social welfare. The central bank must  identify this 
target and then communicate with the public about the actions it is taking to reach it. It is 
hoped that, given the public pressure to reach this target, the central bank will have 
significant incentives to invest in research and other activities, to improve its 
understanding and tools to reach this real target.  
2.  Given that it will strive to reach this target amid other constraints, the central bank  will 
have incentives to develop new tools of monetary policy. For example, if a central bank is 
tasked with hitting an employment target subject to an inflation and balance of payments 
constraint, then – in addition to interest rate policy - it might explore asset allocation 
strategies to encourage banks to lend more to high employment generating uses, and 
capital control techniques to manage balance of payments problems. 
3.   A real targeting approach lends itself naturally to a more democratic, transparent and 
accountable central bank policy that serves the genuine needs of the majority of countries’ 
citizens, rather than the minority that typically benefits from the combination of slower 
growth, low inflation, and high real interest rates.  
4.  The framework is much more conducive to tailoring monetary policy to the specific needs 
of different countries. For example, if a country has a particular problem with generating 
good jobs for women, or more jobs in a particular region of the country, then the real 
targeting approach can accommodate such needs. Of course, the central bank will find it 
difficult to use "macroeconomic" tools to target particular groups or particular regions, but 
the central bank will have an incentive and permission to work with other ministries and 
the private sector to develop tools and mechanisms to improve employment opportunities 
for these groups and regions.  
 
One important objection to a "real targeting" approach to monetary policy is the claim 
that monetary policy does not have control over real variables, especially in the medium to 
long-run.  Of  course,  this  is  the  position  taken  by  orthodox  (i.e.,  pre-Keynesian) 
macroeconomic theory, and incorporates the idea of the "classical dichotomy" in which 
nominal variables, like monetary variables, have no long-run impact on real variables, such 
as  employment.  There  is  very  little  support  for  this  point  view,  and  we  are  violently 
reminded every several years – at times of financial crisis – how wrong this view really is. 
As Keynes argued, the long run is made up of a series of short runs in which, monetary 
 
 
be justified by noting that the output gap affects future inflation, so the central bank focusing solely 
on inflation would still be concerned with the output gap.  
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variables, including those controlled by monetary policy, can have very significant impacts 
on important real variables, such as employment and economic growth. 
 
That is not to say that monetary policy can always easily control these variables with 
any precision. That is clearly not always true. Still, central bank policy, in combination with 
other types of macroeconomic and micro-oriented  policies can clearly have important, 
broadly controllable, effects on these key variables. 
 
In sum, the real targeting approach to monetary policy is likely to be more relevant, 
flexible  and  effective  than  inflation  targeting.  As  a  particularly  relevant  example  of  real 
targeting, employment targeting is described in more detail below.  
 
2.7 Alternatives to Inflation Targeting: 
 
Alternatives  to  inflation  targeting  developed  in  the  PERI/Bilkent  project  on 
alternatives to inflation targeting are discussed here. Table 3 summarizes these approaches. 
 
Table 3 PERI/BILKENT Alternatives To Inflation Targeting Project 












Argentina  SCRER10, inflation, 
activity level 
Same as ultimate 
targets 
Discretion  Sterilization, reserve 









  Asymmetric managed float 
(moving floor on exchange 
rate), bank reserves, bank 
capital requirements, bank 
capital requirements 
NA 




Same as ultimate 
targets 
Discretion  Capital management 
techniques, if necessary 
Integrated 





Discretion  Capital Management 
Techniques 
NA 















Credit allocation techniques 
(eg. asset based reserve 
requirements,  loan 
guarantees, etc.), capital 
management techniques 
Integrated 
Turkey  Inflation; SCRER  NA  Discretion  NA  NA 
Philippines  Inflation; SCRER    Discretion  Capital management 
techniques; prudential 
supervision of banks; 




10 SCRER: Stable and Competitive Real Exchange Rate  
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policies; 
Vietnam  Growth, SCRER, 
Inflation 
  Discretion  Capital management 
techniques; prudential 
supervision of banks; 
targeted credit; incomes 
policies; 
Integrated 
Source: see text; 
NA: No Answer, i.e., the issue was not directly addressed. 
* Central Banks: Integrated means integrated into governmental macroeconomic policy making framework 
                        Coordinated means independent but committed to close coordination with other macroeconomic policy-making institutions 
 
The  papers  in  the  Alternatives  to  Inflation  Targeting  project  present  a  range  of 
alternatives: some are modest adjustments to the inflation targeting framework, others are 
more substantial modifications to the to approach, while still others throw out the inflation 
targeting  framework  in  its  entirety  and  provide a  total  alternative, such  as  employment 
targeting. We discuss many of these in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.7.1 Modest but Useful Adjustments to the Inflation 
Targeting Regime  
 
Some  of  the  country  studies  in  the  PERI/Bilkent  project    proposed  only  modest 
changes to the inflation targeting regime. In the case of  Mexico, for example, the authors 
argue that the inflation targeting regime has allowed for more flexible monetary policy than 
had  occurred under  regimes  with  strict  monetary  targets  or  strict  exchange  rate targets 
(Galindo  and  Ros,  2008),  and  therefore  Galindo  and  Ros  suggest  modifying  the  IT 
framework to make it somewhat more employment friendly. In their analysis of Mexico's 
IT framework, Galindo and Ros find that monetary policy was asymmetric with respect to 
exchange rate movements –tightening when exchange rates depreciated, but NOT loosening 
when exchange rates appreciated. This lent a bias in favor of an over-valued exchange rate 
in Mexico. So Galindo and Ros propose a "neutral" monetary policy so that the central 
bank of Mexico responds symmetrically to exchange rate movements, thereby avoiding 




In his study of Brazil, Nelson Barbosa-Filho also proposed extending the inflation 
targeting framework, but as we will see shortly, he also suggests altering it in a more 
dramatic  way.  Barbosa-Filho  argues  that  because  of  Brazil's  past  experience  with  high 
inflation, the best policy is to continue to target inflation while the economy moves to a 
more stable macroeconomic situation. So far the great gain from inflation targeting has 
been the increase in the transparency and accountability of monetary policy in Brazil." 
(Barbosa-Filho,  2008).  But  he  also  suggests  altering  it  to  make  the  inflation  targeting 
framework  more  compatible  with  fast  income  growth  and    stable  public  and  foreign 
finance. Along these lines, as discussed in the next section,  Barbosa-Filho joins a number 
of the country case study authors in proposing a monetary policy to maintain a stable and 
competitive  real  exchange  rate  (SCRER)  which,  they  argue,  will  have  a  number  of 






11 Galindo and Ros also propose shifting from a CPI target to a domestic inflation target which 
would purge the exchange rate impact on the "target" inflation rate and further reduce the basis for 
the monetary policy bias toward exchange rate appreciation.  
11 
2.7.2 A Competitive and Stable Real Exchange rate 
 
As just indicated, a number of the authors, including Frenkel and Ros (2005) and 
Frenkel and Rapetti (2008) argue that central bank should maintain a moderate inflation 
rate AND should maintain a competitive and stable real exchange rate. They note that the 
real exchange rate can affect employment, and the economy more generally, through a 
number of channels: (1) by affecting the level of aggregate demand (the macroeconomic 
channel) (2) by affecting the cost of labor relative to other goods and thereby affecting the 
amount  of  labor  hired  per  unit  of  output  (the  labor  intensity  channel)and  by  affecting 
employment  through  its  impact  on  investment  and  economic  growth  (the  development 
channel). (eg. Frenkel and Ros , pp. 634-637) While the size and even direction of these 
effects might differ from country to country, in many countries, including countries in Latin 
America,  maintaining  a  competitive  and  stable  real  exchange  rate  is  likely  to  have  a 
positive employment impact overall. (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2008). 
 
From the point of view of monetary policy, the challenge is how to design a policy to 
maintain a  stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER ) so that it does not get 
undermined by massive speculative capital flows. The danger is that if the markets sees the 
central bank trying to manipulate the exchange rate, then the exchange rate will be subject 
to attacks that will undermine the ability of the central bank to prevent the currency from 
excessively appreciating or depreciating. (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2008) As discussed in more 
detail below, central banks can  adopt various types of capital controls and other types of 
capital management techniques to help manage exchange rates in the face of speculative 
capital flows  (Epstein, Grabel, Jomo, 2006). whereto do this, central banks may need to 
expand their of policy EDIT tools in order to try to achieve multiple targets. 
 
2.8 A More Comprehensive Approach: An Employment 
Targeted Economic Program for South Africa 
   
As part of a comprehensive macroeconomic program for South Africa (Pollin, et. al., 
2006), Epstein developed an employment targeting framework for central bank policy to 
replace the Reserve Bank of South Africa's destructive inflation targeting approach. (Also 
see Pollin, et. al., 2008 for an employment targeting program for Kenya). 
 
Under this framework, the central bank, along with other key government institutions, 
identified an employment (or, in this case, an "unemployment rate") target. Then, using 
models  and  estimates  of  the  South  African  macro-economy    a  set  of  monetary  policy 
instruments can be determined – along with a number of other policy tools such as credit 
policy and fiscal policy – which together can achieve the target unemployment rate, while 
maintaining a moderate inflation rate and an acceptable level of exchange rate variability. 
In the particular Vector Auto-Regression Model (VAR) developed by Epstein in Pollin, et. 
al., a simulation model shows that if the South African Reserve bank lowers the interest 
rate from 11% to 7% and holds it at that level for 5 years, economic growth will increase on 
average by .5% per year, inflation will go up by 1 % point and the increase in exchange rate 
variability will be quite modest. In combination with other policies –discussed below - such 
as credit guarantees and subsidized credit for labor intensive sectors, as well as capital 
management techniques and incomes policies if necessary, the unemployment rate can be 
halved by 2014 as proposed by the South African government. 
 
2.9 Diagnostic: VAR modeling of Employment Targeting 
 
One commonly used method to estimate the impacts of macroeconomic policy on 
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth, inflation and exchange rates, is the so-
called Vector Auto-Regression  or VAR approach. This modeling technique estimates a 
simple  macroeconomic  model  of  the  relevant  economy,  using  time  series  regression 
techniques. The resulting model can then be simulated to generally estimate the impact of  
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changes in policy variables, such as a reduction in central bank interest rates on GDP 
growth, employment, inflation and exchange rate variability (or other relevant variables.) 
Among the limitations of this approach are that long time series are often needed to develop 
good estimates of the model. This often means that high frequency data are often needed 
(quarterly, or monthly) and that big structural changes that might affect the underlying 
structure  of  the  economy  need  to  be  relatively  infrequent  within  the  period  under 
estimation. Still, this can be a very useful technique for getting a "ball-park" estimate of the 
likely impact of employment oriented monetary policy. (See Epstein, 2008, for an example 
of this approach in the case of South Africa). 
 
2.10 Targets, Instruments, Knowledge and Central Bank 
Culture 
 
A  key  consideration  is  that  developed  by  Nobel  Prize  winner,  Jan  Tinbergen.  As  
Tinbergen famously put it, policy makers need as many independent instruments as they 
have independent targets. Much of what we discuss below concerns the development of 
additional tools to help the macroeconomic authorities achieve multiple targets.  
 
But the need for learning and innovation by the central bank will be much greater than 
this for a simple but profound reason: most central banks don’t really know very much 
about how to generate employment. The reasons for this are many, but the most important 
one is quite simple: for many years now, most central banks didn’t have to worry about 
generating employment, because they were pressured only to be concerned about inflation 
(or the exchange rate). As a result, central banks (and associated economics researchers the 
world over), have devoted millions of dollars and countless hours on economic analysis and 
modeling  to  figure  out  the  relationship  between  monetary  policy  and  inflation,  while 
spending virtually nothing on discovering the relationship between monetary policy and 
employment generation or monetary policy and financial stability. So not only will the 
central  bank  have  to  develop  new  instruments  because  they  have  more  targets  than 
instruments, but they will have to develop new instruments because the target is “new” and 
unfamiliar.  
 
As  central  banks  learn  more  about  how  to  use  monetary  policy  to  increase 
employment, and as they develop new tools to reach this target subject to an inflation 
constraint, they might discover that they are re-inventing tools that were part of the standard 
central bank tool kit in the developing world in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, as we discuss 
further below: credit allocation policies; giving support to development banks; regulations 
in support of development lending. For the most part, policies such as those that were 
largely eliminated in the 90’s - sometimes for good reason, sometimes not- will be re-




More socially useful central bank frameworks than inflation targeting do exist. These 
can help put decent employment, poverty reduction and financial stability center stage in 
macroeconomic policy making. But these must be supplemented by other instruments and 
supported by other institutions. General fiscal policy is crucial for employment-oriented 
macroeconomic policy. Other institutions, such as development banks, fiscal policy support 
of  credit  allocation  mechanisms,  capital  management  techniques,  and  exchange  rate 










The employment targeting approach to central bank policy described in the previous 
section  might  seem  quite  alien  to  those  schooled  in  the  orthodox  tradition  of  inflation 
targeting and financial liberalization, in fact, policies like those described above historically 
have been quite common in both the currently developed and the developing countries 
(Epstein,  2007).  Over  the  years,  central  banks  have  been  seen  as  agents  of  economic 
development, not just agents of economic stabilization. And while sometimes central banks 
have failed quite spectacularly in this mission, there have been other important success 
stories,  including  important  periods  in  the  U.S.,  U.K.,  France,  Germany,  Japan,  South 
Korea and India, to name just a few examples. In continental Europe, the banking system, 
often directed by the central bank in conjunction with the ministry of finance, helped to 
mobilize and direct credit for industrial development. Even in the U.S. and U.K. these 
policies were used to direct policy to promote social sectors such as housing; in the U.S. 
and the U.K., central bank policy and regulations were used to promote the financial sector 
as well.  
 
As for developing countries, Alice Amsden describes the key role that investment 
banks  played  in  the  industrialization  success  stories  such  as  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
Malaysia,  Brazil,  Argentina  and  others,  in  mobilizing  and  directing  savings  to  key 
industrial sectors, and in particular, those specializing in exports. (Amsden, 2001). In many 
of these cases, central banks were a key part of the government apparatus that played a 
supporting  role  by  maintaining  low  interest  rates,  maintaining  capital  controls  to  help 
stabilize exchange rates at competitive levels, and sometimes engaging in direct lending for 
preferred purposes. 
 
In some countries, engaging in these developmental roles, using a wide variety of 
instruments, was  seen as a key part of the central bank's mission. After the Second World 
War, there was a major transformation of central banking in the developing world. In many 
respects,  these  changes  paralleled  those  in  the  developed  world  just  described.  But  in 
developing  countries,  central  banks  were  much  more  emphatically  agents  of  economic 
development then in many richer countries. (Epstein, 2007a).  Hence, we need to re-engage 
central banks, finance ministries, and the financial system generally in playing a much more 
active role in generating employment, promoting development, and maintaining financial 
stability.  
 
This is especially true now that we have seen again the severe dangers of lightly 
regulated private finance. But even before the most recent disastrous crisis, the promise of 
financial  liberalization  for  development  in  poor  countries  was  lacking  in  supportive 
evidence. 
 
Still, we must be aware of the failures and excesses of some of these approaches in 
some countries. As described in Amsden's book, there must be transparent, accountable, 
and control mechanisms to ensure that these developmentally oriented financial institutions 








The  dominant  financial  policy  in  recent  years  in  most  developing  countries,  has 
focused a financial liberalization. But while financial liberalization has had some successes, 
for example, financial development in Costa Rica and some other countries, it has also had 
numerous failures. On the positive side of the balance sheet, liberalization has furthered the 
integration of developing countries into global markets.  This has meant that some large 
firms, especially in the context of privatization programs, have received significant finance 
through  the  internationally-integrated  capital  markets  created  or  expanded  following 
financial liberalization.  The finance provided to these firms has often been cheaper than 
that available via bank loans.  
 
Still, there is little evidence that the growth of capital markets increases access to or 
lowers the cost of finance for those entrepreneurs that have long confronted severe capital 
constraints.    Indeed,  as  McKinley  shows,  commercial  banks  have  concentrated  their 
activities  in  major  urban  areas  of  developing  countries.    He  goes  onto  explain  that 
“although  aggregate  statistics  of  financial  deepening  might  have  improved  following 
financial liberalization, access to credit has become, if anything, more unequal. The rural 
population remains deprived of credit in most countries, and is likely worse off compared 
to the access to credit that state-owned agricultural banks had previously provided” (p. 21).  
McKinley (2005:23) concludes that, in the African case, the private sector has even less 
access to credit after financial liberalization than before. 
 
Large,  foreign-owned  banks  come  to  play  a  greater  role in  the  domestic financial 
system following the removal of restrictions on their presence.  Large, foreign-owned banks 
that generally enter developing countries after liberalization are often not responsive to the 
needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises SMEs.  
 
There is a large body of empirical evidence demonstrating that domestic financial 
liberalization has failed to deliver many of the rewards claimed by its proponents. Financial 
liberalization  has  created  the  climate,  opportunity  and  incentives  for  investment  in 
speculative activities and a focus on short-term financial gains. In a number of cases, this 
has "crowded out"  long-term developmental returns.  Granted, the creation of a speculative 
bubble may temporarily result in an increase in investment and overall economic activity.  
But  an  unsustainable  and  financially  fragile  environment  or  what  Grabel  (1995)  terms 
“speculation-led development” is unlikely to be in the long-term interest of developing 
countries.  One  channel  by  which the  speculation-led  development  induced  by financial 
liberalization worsens the situation of the poor is through its effect on financial fragility, 
and ultimately on the prevalence of currency, banking and overall financial crises.  Many 
empirical studies find that financial liberalization, including the liberalization of capital 
accounts, often leads to currency and banking crises (see Grabel, 2003a,b,c and Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008a and 2008b).  
 
Financial liberalization also can worsen the situation of the poor by increasing income 
and wealth inequality and by aggravating existing disparities in political and economic 
power.  This is because only a very small proportion of the population is situated to exploit 
the  opportunities  for  speculative  gain  available  in  a  liberalized  financial  environment.  
Speculation-led development often creates a small class of financiers who maintain greater 
ties to financial markets abroad than to those in their own country, and it is also associated 
 
 
12  See Epstein and Grabel (2006), for a discussion of these issues from which some of this is drawn.  
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with a shift in political and economic power from non-financial to financial actors (Grabel, 
2002).  
 
3.3 The Role of the Financial Sector 
 
Hence,  to  promote  more  and  better  employment,  poverty  reduction  and  reduce 
financial  instability,  other  financial  policies  are  required.  To  achieve  these  outcomes, 
financial policies have to serve both general purposes, as well as achieve outcomes quite 
specific to the needs of particular countries and regions. More specifically, the financial 
sector can play an important and productive role in promoting employment growth and 
poverty reduction through the following channels. It can:   
 
￿  Mobilize savings that can be used for productive investment and employment creation; 
￿  Create credit for employment generation and poverty reduction at modest and stable real 
interest rates; 
￿  Allocate credit for employment generation and help the poor to build assets, including in 
agriculture and in small- and medium-sized enterprises and in housing; 
￿  Provide patient (long-term) credit for productivity-enhancing innovation and investment; 
￿  Provide  financing  for  public  investment  to  provide  for  employment  generation  and 
productivity enhancement;  
￿  Help to allocate risks to those who can most easily and efficiently bear those risks; 
￿  Help to stabilize the economy by reducing vulnerability to financial crises, pro-cyclical 
movements in finance, and by helping to maintain moderate rates of inflation; 
￿  Help the poor by providing basic financial and banking services. 
￿  Increase domestic investments, and thus potential self-reliance 
 
3.4 Challenges with Current Financial Structures 
 
There are  many challenges because the financial sector in many developing countries 
are  not  currently  performing  these  roles  to  an  adequate  degree.
13    Despite  financial 
liberalization, and in some cases even because of it, financial structures in many developing 
countries are not fostering development and poverty reduction.  The same can be said of the 
global  financial  system.    In  what  follows,  we  highlight  six  key  problems  with  current 
financial structures in the developing world.
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3.4.1 Challenge no.1:  Real Interest Rates and Interest 
Rate Spreads are high  
 
Real  interest  rate  spreads  remain  very  high  in  many  developing  countries,  and 
especially  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  banking  systems  are  highly  concentrated,  often 
foreign dominated, where banks hold high levels of excess reserves and lend primarily to 
very large businesses and wealthier consumers. (See Heintz, 2008).Table 4 shows some 





13 Of course, there are examples of well performing financial sectors in some developing countries. 
Most of these retain a significant degree of regulation (see Stallings and Studart, 2006), for example, 
for a good discussion of Latin America. 
14 This section draws on McKinley (2006) and Epstein and Grabel (2006). 
15 Ironically, having large cash reserves may have been a saving grace for some banks and banking 
systems in the current crisis. A separate research study could assess the costs and benefits of these 
reserves under different levels of financial stress.  
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Table 4 Interest rate margins in selected areas, 2000 - 2005 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  AVG 
Madagascar  11.50  13.25  13.25  12.75  10.31  8.25  11.55 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.08  13.72  13.00  12.11  12.85  11.67  12.74 
Low-Income  13.08  13.72  13.00  12.44  12.17  11.26  12.61 
World  7.35  7.14  7.18  6.97  6.47  6.52  6.94 
Source: World Development Indicators (2007b) 
 
3.4.2 Challenge no. 2: Credit Creation is too low 
 
In  many  poor  countries,  high  spreads  and  real  interest  rates  are  associated  with 
relatively low rates of credit creation.  
 
3.4.3 Challenge no. 3: Global Savings are badly 
misallocated 
 
While savings rates are too low in some countries,  a bigger issue is that savings are 
badly mis-allocated globally. In recent years a handful of rich countries, most notably the 
United States, has been running savings short-falls relative to investment, while many other 
regions of the world have been saving more than they have been investing. As a result, 
poorer  countries  have  become  net  lenders  of  resources  to  the  United  States,  or  have 
borrowed from the rest of the world much less than they had in earlier periods.  Africa on 
the whole is still a net borrower of funds and its overall savings rate is lower than that of 
the rest of the world. So mobilizing  more savings in Sub-Saharan Africa, in principle, 
would  be  an  important  goal.  However,  if  that  savings  fails  to  translate  into  domestic 
investment and instead goes overseas, then raising the savings rate there would do little for 
growth  or  the  poor.  In  Africa,  especially,  this  problem  of  capital  flight  that  has  been 
exacerbated by capital account liberalization, is an important one (Boyce and Ndikumana, 
2001). Capital management techniques, as we discuss below, can help stem this capital 
flight. 
 
3.4.4 Challenge no. 4: Credit and Capital Flows are 
Pro-Cyclical 
 
When capital flows do come into many developing countries, they are often short-term 
and pro-cyclical, and sometimes associated with "sudden-stops". These can, in turn, lead to 
financial crises that can have devastating economic impacts, often especially for women 
and the poor. Ocampo, 2003). Again, capital management techniques as discussed below 
can help countries manage such disruptive flows. 
 
3.4.5 Challenge no. 5: Insufficient Amount  of Long-
Term, Patient Capital 
 
The short term and unstable flows of international capital represent a more general, 
severe problem facing many developing countries -- namely, there is a dearth of long-term, 
patient capital to support long-term investment (Stallings and Studart, 2006). Much capital 
is of a highly short term nature, especially in the poorest countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 




3.4.6 Challenge no. 6: Insufficient Capital for Small 
and Medium Enterprises and the Poor 
  
17 
Finally, there is a lack of capital for small and medium enterprises and the poor in 
most regions of the world (Stallings and Studart, 2006). This problem flows from many of 
the "stylized facts" described earlier: the high real interest rates and interest rate spreads, 
the mis-allocation of global financial resources, the short-term and pro-cyclical nature of 
international capital flows, and the absence of long-term, patient capital. An additional 
reason  is  the  ability  of  banks  to  allocate  their  assets  to  high  yielding,  relatively  safe, 
government securities, which may crowd out lending to SME's and others. 
 
As we have seen, in many countries, the preferred solution to this problem has been a 
heavy dose of financial liberalization (Nissanke and Aryeetey,1998; Honohan and Beck, 
2007). Recently, liberalization has been combined with the attempt to create a regulatory 
framework  which  would monitor  and  guard  against  financial  instability,  while  creating 
space for private financial investment and enterprise, often from abroad. But as the current 
crisis  demonstrates,  financial  liberalization  by  itself  will  not  be  sufficient  to  do  the  job. 
(Serieux, 2008; Honohan and Beck, 2007; Heintz and Pollin, 2008).  
 
Another increasingly popular approach is to build up the microfinance sector. Micro 
lending can have some very positive impacts: sometimes interest rates are lower than other 
alternatives facing borrowers such as loans from money lenders; some micro-lenders have 
been  able  to  achieve  scales.  Yet,  although  beneficial  for  some,  the  main  problems  of 
microfinance are: 1) the interest rates on loans are often excessively high and 2) the scale of 
loans available is still too often too low to facilitate a significant structural transformation 
and significant increases in productivity. Such loans often finance consumption loans, or 
the start of individual home enterprises at a very low scale, but are not designed to help 
small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs).  Still,  to  be  sure,  microcredit  has  often  found 
innovative  solutions  to  the  problem  that  poor  borrowers  starting  new  businesses  lack 
collateral  and  are  therefore  not  able  to  receive  loans  from  formal  sector  financial 
institutions. A key challenge, then, is to build on the successes of the micro-banking sector, 
and devise ways to bring these successes – modified as necessary – up to scale. 
 
3.4.7 Challenge no. 7: Insufficient attention to the 
problems of rural borrowers 
 
Even though people living in rural areas make up the vast majority of the world's poor, 
rural residents are the most underserved in terms of financial services. A number of the 
solutions presented below should be designed specifically with the rural poor in mind. 
 
3.5 Some Financial Solutions 
 
On important approach, then, is to combine the resources available to formal sector 
financial enterprises and government financial institutions such as the central bank with the 
access,  innovation,  and  lending  experiences  of  microcredit  institutions  (Heintz,  2008; 
Atieno, 2001; Aryeetey, 2001; Pollin, Githinji, and Heintz, 2008). There are several ways 
to do this that have been suggested in the literature, and also put into practice, if only on a 
small-scale basis. Among the most promising are those that involve programs in which 
formal  sector  institutions  such  as  commercial  banks  or  central  banks  take  positions  in 
cooperative, microcredit and other development-oriented financial institutions, either by 
lending to them and or by taking equity positions in them. To be successful, these programs 
usually involve government regulations and subsidies that generate carrots and sticks for 
formal sector institutions to extend credit to these smaller institutions that then on-lend to 
poor and/or small borrowers with good potential. 
 
Another  way  to  raise  lending  and  investment  to  scale  so  that  it  can  have  a 
transformative  impact  is  to  create  development  banking  institutions  that  take  direct 
positions in final borrowers who are engaged in activities that will generate large numbers 
of good jobs and high value- added, and contribute to the structural transformation of the  
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economy. The government of Madagascar is considering this approach, as we discuss in 
more detail below. 
 
Mobilizing financial resources and allocating them to productive units in key sectors 
could be a crucial component of the development strategy for developing countries.  
Building  on  work  we  have  undertaken  in  Ghana,  South  Africa,  Kenya  and 
Madagascar, we suggest financial policies and innovations that could be implemented, such 
as asset-backed reserve requirements, development banking, and loan guarantees, that can 
help generate more investment in key sectors to increase employment and incomes for the 
poor (Pollin, Epstein, Heintz, and Ndikumana, 2006; Epstein and Heintz, 2006; Pollin, 
Githinji, and Heintz, 2008; Epstein and Grabel, 2006). 
 
Here we outline several policies along these lines that can be used to help re-deploy 
and transform the financial sector to facilitate the MAP and help achieve more good jobs, 
raise productivity, and reduce poverty in Madagascar.
16 In particular we will focus on three: 
1)  Asset  backed  reserve  requirement  (ABRR);  2) loan  guarantees; and  3)  development 
banking. 
 
3.6 Formal Sector Banks 
 
Carrots and sticks need to be applied to formal sector banks to get them to lend more 
to high- priority sectors , or that can be identified by the type of input-output analysis we 
described above. Here we present two examples of carrots and sticks that can be used to 
encourage formal sector banks to become so engaged. The first is asset- backed reserve 
requirements (ABRR); the second, more extended example, is loan guarantees. 
 
3.6.1 Example I: Asset-backed reserve requirements 
(ABRR) 
 
As discussed in more detail in Pollin et al. (2006, 2008), with a system of asset-backed 
reserve requirements (ABRR), banks are required to hold reserves against their income-
earning assets. However, they are allowed to hold smaller required reserves on assets that 
are identified as contributing to employment generation and poverty reduction, perhaps 
using the type of analysis we describe below. This would encourage banks to lend directly 
to  high-priority  sectors.  Similarly,  securities  issued  by  smaller  institutions  that  are 
experienced  in  making  loans  to  small/poor  borrowers  or  small  and  medium  sized 
enterprises,  microfinance  institutions  (MFIs),  and  rural  banking  cooperatives  can  have 
preferred reserve requirements as well.  
  




A loan guarantee program could help to mobilize resources from  commercial banks 
for on-lending to microcredit and other institutions who have the knowledge and experience 
to on-lend to cooperatives, small entrepreneurs, and businesses for productive activity, or to 
make direct loans to the final borrowers, if the commercial banks so choose. The basic idea 
is that the government would guarantee a certain percentage of the loan, thereby reducing 
 
 
16  This  section  draws  heavily  on  Epstein  and  Heintz  (2006);  Epstein  (2007);  Heintz  and  Pollin 
(2008); Pollin et al. (2006, 2008). 
17 This  section  draws  extensively  on  Pollin  et  al.  (2008), especially  chapter  9.  Also  see  Atieno 
(2001), who discusses such a program for Kenya.  
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the default risk faced by the bank; this can help to substitute for collateral which most 
borrowers in the target group will not be able to provide. This would also help keep the 
interest rate charged to the final borrowers lower. 
 
There has been extensive experience with loan guarantee schemes spanning many 
countries over many years. Green (2003) estimates that there have been over 2000 loan 
guarantee  programs  of  various  kinds  in  almost  100  countries,  including  most  OECD 
countries as well as in many developing countries. Evidence on their success is mixed, as 
one would expect with some many schemes in so many places. (Green, 2003; Beck, et. al., 
2008; Honohan, 2008). In the United States and Canada, major loan guarantee schemes for 
small  business  are  seen  as  quite  successful.  (Green,  2003,  p.  22.)  Many  programs 
established in Latin America in the 1980's and in some parts of Africa then a bit later, 
however, are commonly seen as having failed. (Green, p. 23.) Still, according to a UNIDO 
sponsored study, the best developed African schemes are in Egypt, Morocco and South 
Africa. (Green, p. 23). 
 
While there are many types of loan guarantee programs, we discuss one such type here 
(see Honohan, 2008, Beck., et. al, 2008 and Green 2003 for a discussion of other types of 
programs.) Our suggested program works as follows. The government chooses to guarantee 
a certain portion of loans from commercial banks or other lenders to borrowers who will 
achieve  program  goals,  such  as  generate  more  decent  jobs,  increase  productivity,  and 
improve the quality of jobs, or invest in innovations or infrastructure to reduce the cost of 
inputs or consumption goods consumed by the poor, and thereby have strong multiplier 
effects through the economy to raise the standard of living of the poor. The guarantees may 
also underwrite a program by commercial banks to lend to microcredit institutions who will 
then lend to final borrowers. 
 
In setting up such a program, there are several issues that must be addressed: 
1.   How to determine to whom to lend 
2.  What should be the rate of loan guarantee? 
3.   How to monitor the program to avoid corruption, excessive moral hazard, and inefficiency 
 
3.6.3 How to determine to whom to lend 
 
Indirect lending to development institutions. The key here is to start with development 
finance institutions that have the knowledge, track record, and experience to identify final 
borrowers that can use the credit productively to create decent jobs, directly or indirectly, 
for themselves and, on a larger scale, for others in their community. The point is to raise the 
scale and reach of these institutions. Careful attention needs to be paid to the organizational 
structure of the program, and it may vary from region to region. But the key is to pool the 
resources to be able to benefit from economies of scale and knowledge, without so much 
centralization that the programs bypass small borrowers that can both benefit directly and 
have the possibility to help create value for their locales and communities. 
 
Direct lending by commercial banks. If the large banks want to start lending directly 
to such borrowers, then, since they do not have a track record of doing so, it would work 
best if they were to develop a business plan and a “Decent Employment Impact Statement” 
that makes clear how many jobs, and at what wages and benefits, would be generated by 
their loans, and, if possible, some clear idea of the domestic linkages and multiplier effects. 
Such direct lending, especially to small and medium enterprises, could be highly desirable, 
but to receive the loan guarantees, they would have to demonstrate the likely employment 
effects. As we will see beow, a number of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will be 
useful to ensure that these employment impacts are actually forthcoming. 
 
3.6.4 What should be the rate of loan guarantee? 
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In choosing the rate of loan guarantee, there are a number of considerations that must 
be  taken  into  account,  including  moral  hazard,  and  the  cost  of  the  program  to  the 
government. The problem of moral hazard dictates that the government guarantee must be 
less than 100% of the loan, and possibly significantly less. To reduce moral hazard (and the 
cost  to  the  government), other  mechanisms  that substitute  for  collateral should  also  be 
developed, as we describe below. As we see momentarily, the cost to the government will 
also depend on the rate of guarantee. The higher the rate of guarantee, all else constant, the 
higher the cost to the government and the greater the problem of moral hazard. However, 
the  lower  the  rate  of  government  guarantee,  the  less  attractive  will  be  the  program  to 
lenders and to borrowers. 
 
3.6.5 How much would this program cost the 
government? 
 
Setting aside administrative costs, the major cost to which the government would be 
exposed is the cost of defaults. How large a cost would this be to the government? This 
depends on the size of the program and the default rate. Let’s start first with the size of the 
program. Take the case of Madagascar, for example. According to the Madagascar Action 
Plan (MAP), the government wants to raise the rate of gross domestic investment from 
22.5% of GDP in 2005 to 30% of GDP by 2012 (MAP, Commitment 6). To help achieve 
this goal, let’s say the government implements a loan guarantee program equal to 5% of 
GDP  (a  little  more  than  20%  of  investment  in  2005)  in  the  hope  that  this  would 
substantially raise the rate of investment according to the MAP’s goal.  
 
Now turn to the rate of default. Take the example of Madagascar again. According to 
the  latest  figures  compiled  by  the  Madagascar  banking  commission,  the  rate  of  non-
performing loans on the commercial banks was 9% in 2007 and, at the height of the recent 
political instability, it was 19.6%. Let’s say that the rate of default was much higher than 
that, say 30%. What would the cost of the program be? In this case, the cost would be .3 X 
.05 = 1.5% of GDP. The budget deficit in 2007 was about 500 billion Ariary, or 3.6% of 
GDP. 
 
If the default rate was 20% instead of 30%, which is probably a more realistic figure, 
then the cost would be 1% of GDP, thereby raising the budget deficit by significantly less 
than one third.  
 
The program could be made cheaper of course by reducing the guarantee rate.  Hence 
there is a tradeoff between the rate of guarantee (and, therefore, the cost to the government) 
and the cost to the borrower, all else being equal. 
 
What other changes could reduce the severity of this tradeoff?  There are several: 
 
1.   Reduce  the  rate  of  default:    If  the  rate  of  default  was  lower,  then  the  cost  to  the 
government  would  be  lower  for  any  rate  of  guarantee.  Having  a  good  system  of 
monitoring, and good programs of selecting and working with borrowers, is crucial to 
reducing the default rate. We discuss this below in terms of anti-corruption measures. 
There other important measures learned from micro-credit and other lending, including 
educational programs and mutual monitoring,  (in the next section????...this seems too 
limited  as  it  focuses  on  monitoring  as  an  anti-corruption  tool  but  there  is  more  to 
“selecting and working with borrowers to reduce the default rate” than that). 
2.   Reduce the base rate. There are several ways of reducing the base rate: 
￿  Less tight monetary policy can lower the base rate, for any given inflation rate.  
￿  More  competition  in  the  banking  system  can  lower  the  rate,  which  is  quite  high  by 
international standards. 




3.6.7 Monitoring and anti-corruption protection 
 
As discussed in detail in Pollin, Githinji, and Heintz (2008), a potential problem with 
any  program  is  corruption.  In  business  as  well  as  government,  monitoring  and 
accountability issues will be crucial. In the case of the loan guarantee program, it is quite 
easy to see the form that corruption could take, especially where the government guarantees 
a large percentage of the loan: the lender and borrower could arrange a false loan; the 
borrower could default, receive the  payment from the government, and split the proceeds.  
 
Of  course,  close  monitoring  and  accounting  could,  in  principle,  prevent  such 
corruption from occurring. But monitoring itself has costs and there are advantages to add 
complimentary measures to monitoring schemes to reduce the incentives for corruption. 
Pollin  et  al.  (2006,  2008)  have  designed  an  anti-corruption  system  based  on  escrow 
accounts  and  “whistleblower”  awards  that  can  help  cut  down  on  the  likelihood  of 
significant corruption. These are described briefly in the following paragraph. 
 
3.6.8 Incentive-based monitoring 
 
Escrow  accounts.  To  reduce  the  incentive  for  corruption,  the  government  could 
implement a system of escrow accounts. The account would work as follows: the lender 
places a percentage of the loan in an escrow account with the government or central bank. 
If  there  is  a  default,  the  lender  will receive  the  amount  placed in  escrow  only  after  a 
thorough investigation of the case to establish there was no corruption involved. If there is 
no default, then the borrower receives the amount at the end of the period, which can then 
be rolled over as part of the new loan with minimal administrative interventions (forms, 
filings, etc.) or can be repaid to the lender. Such escrow accounts clearly cut down on 
incentives for corruption, but this is at some cost in terms of the availability of funds to the 
borrower. 
 
Whistleblower  incentives.  This  is  another  incentive-based  monitoring  measure 
suggested by Pollin et al. (2007), based on an idea promoted by Dean Baker. His idea is to 
create  large  penalties  for  fraud,  combined  with  high  rewards  for  “whistleblowers” 
(combined with strong penalties for fraud on their part). For example, defrauding the loan 
guarantee  system  would  involve  large  civil and possibly  even  criminal  penalties.  Bank 
employees or others with key information used to prove or to lead to investigations that 
would prove fraud, receive a sizeable financial reward.  
 
Corruption and inefficiency can plague all economic endeavors, be they private or 
public. Having sensible, serious policies in place to reduce the incentives for corruption and 
to  identify  and  penalize  can  make  a  key  difference  between  a  successful  and  an 
unsuccessful program. 
 
One objection to these types of mechanisms is that they might seem to be similar to 
the “directed lending programs” that have failed in earlier periods. However, the programs 
described  above  are  designed  to  incorporate  strong  monitoring  and  anti-corruption 
mechanisms and are also part of development programs that are embedded inlarge-scale 
market-based initiatives. 
 
3.6.9 How to pay for the loan guarantee program 
 
Loan guarantees can be attractive, at least on a start-up basis, to foreign aid donors. 
But donors aside, a key source of funds could be a dedicated tax which underwrites this set 
of financial incentives for economic transformation.  Of course there will be many worthy 
demands  on    tax  revenues.  We  argue  here  that  among  the  demands  that  should  be  
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considered, is a loan guarantee program to help generate investments in good jobs for the 
long term. 
 
3.6.10 Development banking initiatives  
 
Development  banking  initiatives  were  crucial  in  the  successful  development  of 
industrial economies of Asia and Latin America, what Alice Amsden calls “The Rise of the 
Rest” (Amsden, 2001), but the reputation of “development banking” experiences in Africa 
has  been  seriously  tarnished.  Yet  the  major  challenges  for  development  and  financial 
policies – and the insufficiency of financial liberalization as a solution - call for a re-
consideration of numerous policy options, including the revival of development banking  
(Ndikumana, 2007). Success of development banking initiations edit in Africa depends on: 
integration  of  development  finance  institutions  into  the  national  development  agenda; 
appropriate governance; efficient operating procedures; minimizing non-interest barriers to 
access to credit; and innovative strategies for the mobilization of stable long-term funds 
(Ndikumana, 2007, p. 32).  
 
Integration of finance institutions means that the design of the national development 
plan should specifically take into account the role of these institutions. This could include 
the  mandating  that  development  banking  institutions  focus  on  specific  sectors;  the 
government  developing  a  monitoring  system  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the 
development banks; and a system of incentives to award good performance and to penalize 
poor performance. (Ndikumana, 2007). 
 
3.7 Central Bank Support for Development Banking and 
Small-Scale Financial Institutions 
 
As discussed in Epstein (2007a), central banks have historically played a much larger 
role in supporting longer-term economic development goals than has become fashionable 
more recently. This has been true both in developing countries and in the now developed 
countries. Central banks, acting as agents of development, have bought long-term bonds for 
infrastructure  development;  kept  and  administered  differential  interest  rate  ceilings  in 
support of favored sectors, such as housing in many developed countries (Epstein, 2007a); 
used their discount window to discount loans for specialized lending institutions, such as 
microcredit institutions in Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2000); and provided efficient or 
even subsidized financial services for specialized institutions playing important social roles. 
These policies have not always been successful, but if planned carefully with monitoring 
and safeguards, have an important part to play in mobilizing and re-deploying finance for 
development  purposes.  For  example,  central  bank  support  for  the  Grameen  Bank  in 
Bangladesh and for rural development banks in Indonesia have been very successful (Asian 
Development Bank, 2000) in terms of offering loans to rural inhabitants and providing 
financial services. in what sense? In terms of jobs created, outreach???.  Another role that 
central  banks  have  successfully  played  is  the  management  of  funds  from  the  central 
government, and on-lending to MFIs and other institutions engaging in rural and small 
business lending (Ndikumana, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2000). 
 
In  addition,  central  banks  can  play  an  important  promotional  role  in  undertaking 
studies  relevant  to  developmental  finance,  and  providing  data  and  technical  support  to 
institutions undertaking more active financial roles and training (Asian Development Bank, 
2000). In countries that have successfully developed rapidly, central banks have taken an 
active role in mobilizing and channeling resources for developmental purposes (Epstein, 
2007a). 
 
 3.8 Diagnostic II: Using Input-Output Models with 
Credit Allocation Data to Help Allocate Credit 
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One big question that arises from this approach is the following: how does one figure 
out what sectors should be promoted in the hopes that they will generate more employment 
and poverty reduction? This question must be approached at several different levels. At a 
general level, there are broad diagnostic tools, such as the one briefly described in this 
section, that can be applied to identify promising sectors. But as we will see, this tool can 
only give a broad indication. To implement a strategy of credit promotion as we have 
described, there is no  substitute for having institutions – public and private – with 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  local  economy  and  contextand  with  the  incentives  and 
management  to  make  detailed  decisions.  As  we  have  described  above,  there  are 
mechanisms to mobilize and re-direct banks and other institutions to carry out this 
knowledge acquisition and investments. 
 
Still, the diagnostic tool described below can be a very useful planning tool at a broad 
level.  Using  readily  available  data,  sectors  likely  to  generate  directly  and  indirectly,  a 
significant number of jobs can be determined. The next step is to design programs so that 
the  financial  sector  will  support  these  sectors.  We  present  below  some  data  from 
Madagascar, similar work in South Africa and Kenya has also been done. 
 
3.9 A Sectoral Analysis of Finance and Employment 
 
The input-output diagnostic tool in the case of Madagascar is described here(see Epstein, 
et. al., 2008). Table  5, based on the Madagascar enterprise survey, shows the extent to 
which various sectors had their credit needs met. 
 
Table 5 Large enterprises in key sectors have easiest access to credit in Madagascar 
Branch and Type of Enterprise  Satisfied (%) 
Extractive activities  100.0 
Manufacturing  27.8 
Production and distribution of energy  100.0 
Construction  43.6 
Trade  28.6 
Hotels and restaurants.  34.2 
Transport and communications  63.4 
Real estate and other services  16.3 
Microenterprises  30.3 
SMEs  46.7 
Large enterprises  51.0 
Source: Madagascar Enterprise Survey (2005) 
 
To  what  extent  are  these  sectors  creating  jobs  and  wages  for  the  economy?  To 
understand how to answer this question, we need to take a short detour to explain the 
construction of the input-output diagnostic tool. 
 
3.10 The Input-Output Model 
 
To understand the dynamics of output, employment, and value-added in a country, we 
constructed a standard input-output (I-O) model for Madagascar, which also incorporated 
employment data from the 2001 household survey (Enquête Auprès des Ménages), the most 
recent data available. Specifically, we quantify the relative impact of economic stimuli to 
particular  sectors  (e.g.,  clothing  or  tourism)  or  to  specific  categories  of  aggregate 
expenditures  (e.g.,  exports,  household  consumption,  or  investment).  In  addition,  we 
examine the industrial structure of the Malagasy economy, particularly with regard to the 
density of upstream and downstream linkages. 
  
24 
In  Madagascar,  wage  employment  accounts  for  a  relatively  small fraction  of total 
employment. Various forms of self-employment, particularly agricultural self-employment, 
account  for  the  majority  of  employment.  Therefore,  typical  employment  multipliers  – 
which are often predicated on the assumption of wage employment –do not fully assess the 
overall employment impact of different economic policies and stimuli. In the case of self-
employment, the impact will likely take the form of increasing earnings (i.e. value-added) 
instead of increasing the number of “jobs.” Of course, changes in the relative earnings of 
different types of employment may result, over time, in differential entry into and exit from 
specific  economic  activities.  This  could  ultimately  alter  the  composition  of  self-
employment. We do not focus on the long-run effects of labor migration and mobility in 
our analysis. Instead we focus on short-run changes to labor market outcomes. In the case 
of the self-employed, for the type of analysis pursued here, assumes that the direct impact 
of a sectoral or aggregate economic stimulus will manifest itself in terms of increases in 
value-added and earnings. 
 
For wage employment, we calculate typical employment  multipliers using the  I-O 
model.  We  estimate  wage  employment/output  ratios  for  the  various  sectors.  We  were 
concerned  that  a  total  count  of  employment  in  waged  positions  could  overstate  the 
employment impact of a given change in output, since underemployed individuals would be 
weighted the same as a full-time employee. We also wanted to take into account the fact 
that individuals frequently are engaged in more than one type of employment. Therefore, 
we  converted  all  wage  employment  in  primary  and  secondary  activities  into  “full-time 
equivalents.”  
 
The output multipliers show the impact of a 1 million Ariary increase in the final 
demand for output of the industry in question on total economic output in Madagascar. The 
value-added multipliers can be interpreted in a parallel manner. They indicate the impact on 
value-added, not industrial output. Value-added is equal to the value of industrial output 
less  the  value  of  intermediate  inputs  used  in  production.  Therefore,  the  value-added 
multiplier  must  be  less  than  the  output  multiplier.  The  difference  between  the  output 
multiplier and the value-added multiplier reflects direct and indirect changes in the demand 
for domestically produced intermediate inputs associated with a change in final demand. 
The value- added multiplier is a better indicator of the impact of expanding the sector on 
incomes  in  Madagascar  than  is  the  output  multiplier.  Also  of  interest  are  the  wage 
employment multipliers. These indicate the total number of jobs (measured as full-time 
equivalents, as discussed above) across all sectors that would be generated by a 1 million 
Ariary increase in the final demand for the output of the specific sector in question.  
 
One of the reasons for the variations in the size of the multipliers, particularly the 
output multipliers, is that different industrial sectors have different linkages to the domestic 
economy. Some sectors have a large number of “upstream” linkages to other activities – 
meaning  that  they  utilize  a  large  amount  of  domestically  produced  inputs  in  their 
production processes. Others have “downstream” linkages – their outputs are used by other 
domestic firms to produce final goods and services. Industries may have weak multipliers 
when they import the inputs used in production. This is one of the principal leakages that 
occurs in a standard I-O model. In our model, which incorporates endogenous household 
consumption, we note that leakages can also occur when households buy imported goods 
instead of domestically produced ones. 
 
We  can  construct  general  indicators  of  the  extent  of  upstream  and  downstream 
linkages  in  the  Malagasy  economy.  The  density  of  upstream  linkages  is  estimated  by 
calculating the value of domestically sourced inputs as a percent of the value of total non-
labor  inputs  into  production  (calculated  at  market  prices).  The  density  of  downstream 
linkages is estimated by the amount of domestic industrial demand expressed as a percent 
of  total  domestic  output  for  each  sector.  In  addition,  we  calculate  an  indicator  of  the 
intensity of use of imported inputs – the value of imported inputs expressed as a percent of 
total non-labor production costs.  
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Table 6 Consolidated industry multipliers in Madagascar 
  Multipliers   
      Employment (per million Ariary)  Upstream Linkages 






Wage  Non-Ag.  Domestically Sourced 
Inputs as % of Non-
labor Production 
Costs 
Agriculture  3.4  2.0  292  157  65% 
Extractive 
industries 
3.5  1.8  384  340  71% 
Manufacturing  3.3  1.5  264  203  65% 
Energy  2.3  0.7  311  295  36% 
Construction  3.0  1.4  208  174  53% 
Commerce/trade  3.5  2.0  278  227  75% 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
3.5  1.3  289  236  72% 
Transport and 
communications 
3.5  1.7  342  299  76% 
Real estate and 
business services 
3.9  1.9  507  458  89% 
Source: Derived from input-output tables (2001) (see Epstein, et. al. 2008) 
 
Using  these  multipliers,  we  can  see  that  in  Madagascar,  credit  is  apparently  not 




Table 7 Credit is not allocated to sectors with highest  
multipliers or upstream linkages 





Commerce/trade  26.6  2.0  75% 
Agriculture  NA  2.0  65% 
Real estate/Business services  16.3  1.9  89% 
Extractive industry  100  1.8  71% 
Transpiration/Communications  63.4  1.7  76% 
Manufacturing  27.8  1.5  65% 
Construction  43.6  1.4  53% 
Hotels/Restaurants  34.2  1.3  72% 
Energy  100  .7  36% 







The financial sector, which in many countries have has failed to play an important role 
in development, must be mobilized to help promote development, poverty reduction and 
 
 
18 The term "directly" refers to the employment generated within the particular sector; by "indirectly" 
we mean the employment generated in the sectors that sell inputs to the sector at issue.  
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decent employment. This section suggested some concrete approaches, policy tools, and 
diagnostics  to  help  carry  out  these  mobilization.  Of    course,  these  are  very  general 
approaches and they must be fine tuned and made specific to the country contexts when 
actually applied. 
 
With  globalization  and  the  increased  integration  of  economies  –  with  all  their 
attendant opportunities and risks – employment oriented macroeconomic policy must also 
cope  with  the  crucial  international  macroeconomic  dimensions  to  succeed.  Among  the 
many international issues that bear on this problem, we deal next with just two: exchange 
rate management and management of capital flows. These are both intimately related to the 
issues of financial stability and employment oriented macroeconomic policy. 
 
 




International  financial  markets  have  become  treacherous  for  developing  countries. 
Even in the best of circumstances, developing countries, by virtue of their size and location 
in the global economy, cannot help but be buffeted by major swings in the markets. Still, 
developing countries can undertake policies to protect themselves from the exigencies of 
global prices, commodity and financial flows. And in calmer times, these countries need 
tools to best manage their macroeconomic needs within a global context, especially if they 
want to achieve better outcomes for decent employment, poverty reduction and financial 
stability.  We  have  seen  that  an  employment  oriented  monetary  and  financial  policy 
framework needs to be able to have a stable and competitive real exchange rate, the ability 
to mobilize and allocate credit to desired sectors, reasonable real interest rates and inflation 
rates, and financial stability. 
 
Managing the real exchange rate and international debt and capital flows is crucial to 
achieving these outcomes. These are difficult even under the best of circumstances, and 
become extremely difficult to achieve in a context of wide-spread financial liberalization, 
as unstable and pro-cyclical inflows of capital can lead to inappropriate real exchange rates. 
Also, when capital suddenly stops coming in and then leaves  ("sudden-stops") it can leave 
a trail of debts and problems that are difficult to cope with. Hence, capital management 
techniques, widely used by successful countries such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and others, need to be employed to deal with these swings in capital and debt 
flows, as well as for managing the real exchange rate. 
 
Capital  management  techniques  have  been  used  by  a  variety  of  countries  to 
supplement the macroeconomic policy tool-box, in light of our earlier discussion of targets 
and  instruments  available  to  central  banks  and  financial  authorities  in  general.  As 
discussed,,  central  banks  need  more  tools  if  they  are  to  achieve  a  larger  number  of 
objectives. Capital management techniques are among the most important tools that can use 
to help deal with the exigencies of  the international financial markets. 
 





19  This  section  draws  extensively  on  Epstein,  Grabel  and  Jomo  (2003)  and  Epstein  and  Grabel 
(2006), and the papers by Grabel in the reference section.  
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Capital management techniques, refers to two complementary (and often overlapping) 
types of financial policies:  policies that govern international private capital flows and those 
that enforce prudential management of domestic financial institutions.  Regimes of capital 
management take diverse forms and are multi-faceted.  Capital management techniques can 
be  static  or  dynamic.    Static  management  techniques  are  those  that  authorities  do  not 
modify in response to changes in circumstances.  Capital management techniques can also 
be dynamic in that they can be activated or adjusted as circumstances warrant.  Three types 
of circumstances trigger implementation of management techniques or lead authorities to 
strengthen  or  adjust  existing  regulations--changes  in  the  economic  environment,  the 
identification of vulnerabilities, and the attempt to close loopholes in existing measures. 
 
Some types of capital management techniques have a proven track record, not just in 
the decades that followed WWII, but in the current environment as well.  This latter fact is 
increasingly  recognized  today,  even  by  many  prominent  economists  and  the  IMF  (eg., 
Prasad  et  al.,  2003)  who  have  recently  written  rather  positively  (2008)—though 
nevertheless cautiously—about the role of certain types of market-based, temporary capital 
management  techniques  .The  problems  associated  with  unfettered  international  private 
capital flows have become quite obvious, particularly in light of the current financial crises  
Capital management techniques played critically important roles during the high-growth 
eras of Japan and South Korea and were successfully employed in Brazil in the 1950s and 
60s. (e.g., Nembhard, 1996).  Chile and Colombia successfully used capital management 
techniques during the 1990s.  The Malaysian government successfully employed stringent 
capital management policies in 1994 and 1998.  India, Singapore, China, and Taiwan POC 
employed diverse strategies that could be termed (even if not by the government itself) 
capital management techniques during the 1990s.   
 
Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003) presented seven case studies of the divers capital 
management techniques employed in Chile, Colombia, Taiwan Province of China, India, 
China, Singapore and Malaysia during the 1990s.  The cases reveal that policymakers were 
able to use capital management techniques to achieve critical macroeconomic objectives.  
These included the prevention of maturity and locational mismatch
20; attraction of favored 
forms  of  foreign  investment;  reduction  in  overall  financial  fragility,  currency  risk,  and 
speculative pressures in the economy; insulation from the contagion effects of financial 
crises;  and  enhancement  of  the  autonomy  of  economic  and  social  policy,  including 
employment generation.  The paper examines the structural factors that contributed to these 
achievements,  and  also  weighs  the  costs  associated  with  these  measures  against  their 
macroeconomic benefits. (See Grabel, 2003) 
 
The general policy lessons of these seven experiences are as follows.  
1.   Capital management techniques can enhance overall financial and currency stability, 
buttress the autonomy of macro and micro-economic policy, and bias investment toward 
the long-term.  
2.   The efficacy of capital management techniques is highest in the presence of strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals, though management techniques can also improve 
fundamentals.   
 
 
20 Maturity mismatch occurs when borrowers finance long-term obligations with short-term credit, 
leaving them vulnerable to changes in the supply and cost of credit.  Locational mismatch occurs 
when borrowers contract debts that are repayable in foreign currency, leaving them vulnerable to 
currency depreciation that increases the cost of debt service.   
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3.   The nimble, dynamic application of capital management techniques is an important 
component of policy success.  4.) Controls over international capital flows and prudential 
domestic financial regulation often function as complementary policy tools, and these tools 
can be useful to policymakers over the long run.  5.) State and administrative capacity play 
important roles in the success of capital management techniques.  6.) Evidence suggests 
that the macroeconomic benefits of capital management techniques probably outweigh 
their microeconomic costs.  7.) Capital management techniques work best when they are 
coherent and consistent with a national development vision.  8.) There is no single type of 
capital management technique that works best for all developing countries.  Indeed our 
cases, demonstrate a rather large array of effective techniques.   
 
Tables  8  and  9  summarize  many  of  the  key  aspects  and  impacts  of  the  capital 
management techniques employed by a range of developing countries during the 1990s 
(from Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2003). These tables complement the discussion below by 
giving quite specific and concrete country experiences to illustrate the general points about 
capital management techniques in the discussion that follows. 
 
Table 8 Experiences with Capital Management Techniques in the 1990's* 
Country  Types of Capital Management Techniques  Objectives of Capital Management Techniques 
Chile  Inflows 
Inflow management 
FDI and PI: One year Residence Requirement  
30% URR 
Borrowing Restrictions:Tax on foreign loans: 
1.2% per year 
Outflows: No Restrictions 
Domestic financial Regulations: strong 
regulatory measures 
-Lengthen maturity structures and stabilize inflows 
 
-help manage exchange rates to maintain export 
competitiveness 
 
-protect economy from financial instability 
Colombia  Similar to Chile  Similar to Chile 
Taiwan  Inflows 
non-residents 
-bank accounts can only be used for domestic 
spending, not financial speculation 
-foreign participation in stock market regulated 
-FDI tightly regulated 
residents 
regulation of foreign borrowing 
Outflows 
Exchange controls 
Domestic Financial Regulations 




-Help manage exchange for export competitiveness 
 








-financial institutions can't extend S$ credit to 
non-residents if they are likely to use for 
speculation 
-non-residents: if they borrow for use abroad, 
must swap first into foreign currency 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
-restrictions on creation of swaps, and other 
derivatives that could be used for speculation 
against S$ 
-to prevent speculation against Singapore $ 
 
-to support "soft peg" of  S$ 
 
-to help maintain export competitiveness 
-to help insulate Singapore from foreign financial 
crises 
Malaysia  Inflows 
-restrictions on foreign borrowing 
Outflows 
non-residents 
-12 month repatriation waiting period 
-to maintain political and economic sovereignty 
 
- kill the offshore ringit market 
 
-shut down offshore share market  
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-graduated exit levies 
inversely proportional to length of stay 
residents 
exchange controls 
domestic financial regulations 
non-residents 
-restrict access to ringit 
residents 
encourage to borrow domestically and invest 
 
-to help reflate the economy 
 
-to help create financial stability and insulate the 
economy from contagion 
India  Inflows 
non-residents 






Domestic Financial Regulations 
-strict limitations on development of domestic 
financial markets 
-support industrial policy 
 
-pursue capital account liberalization in an incremental 
and controlled fashion 
 
-insulate domestic economy from financial contagion 
 
-preserve domestic savings and forex reserves 
 
-help stabilize exchange rate 
China  Inflows 
non-residents 
-strict regulation on sectoral FDI investment 




-no restrictions on repatriation of funds 
-strict limitations on borrowing Chinese 
Renminbi for speculative purposes 
residents 
exchange controls 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
-strict limitations on residents and non-
residents 
-support industrial policy 
 
-pursue capital account liberalization in incremental 
and controlled fashion 
 
-insulate domestic economy from financial contagion 
 
-increase political sovereignty 
 
-preserve domestic savings and foreign exchange 
reserves 
 
-help keep exchange rates at competitive levels 
Sources: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004. 
*This description applies to the experience during the 1990's and not necessarily in the current period.  
 
Table 9 Effects of Capital Management Techniques in  Seven Cases 
Country  Achievements  Supporting Factors  Costs 
Chile  -Altered composition and 
maturity of inflows 
-reduced vulnerability to 
contagion 
-well designed policies 




-higher cost of capital for small 
firms 
Colombia  -similar to Chile but less 
successful 
-less state capacity than Chile 
-less flexible 
 
Taiwan POC  -kept debt load manageable  
-help to keep competitive 
exchange rate 
-insulated from financial 
crises 
-helped to maintain economic 
sovereignty 
   
Singapore  -insulated from disruptive 
speculation 
-helped manage soft peg 
-contribute to financial 
strength 
-strong state capacity 
-strong economic 
fundamentals 
   
-possibly contributed to a less 
developed financial sector 
Malaysia  -facilitated macroeconomic 
reflation 
-helped to maintain domestic 
economic sovereignty 
-public support for policies  -possible cronyism/corruption  
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India  -facilitated incremental 
liberalization 
-insulated from financial 
contagion 
- helped preserve domestic 
saving 
-helped to maintain economic 
sovereignty 
-strong state and bureaucratic 
capacity 
-stong public support 
-restricted the development of 
the domestic financial sector 
China  -facilitated industrial policy -
insulated economy from 
financial contagion 
-helped to preserve savings 
-helped to manage exchange 
rate and facilitate export led 
growth 
-helped to maintain 
expansionary macro-policy 
-helped to maintain economic 
sovereignty 




-constrained the development of 
the financial sector 
-facilitated corruption 
Source: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004. 
 
4.3 Managing Real Exchange Rates 
 
Exchange market intervention, supported by capital management techniques can be 
helpful,  and  indeed  might  be  essential  to  help  maintain  a  stable  and  competitive  real 
exchange  rate  as  we    discussed  earlier.  China,  Korea,  Taiwan,  India  and  many  other 
countries  have  used  capital  management  techniques  as  an  additional  tool  to  support 
employment  and  growth  policies  undertaken  by  governments,  including  by  the  central 
bank. 
 
Examples include, Galindo and Ros (2008), as part of Epstein/Yeldan's project on 
alternatives to inflation targeting in Mexico. Galindo and Ros found that monetary policy 
was asymmetric with respect to exchange rate movements –tightening when exchange rates 
depreciated, but not loosening when exchange rates appreciated. This lent a bias in favor of 
an over-valued exchange rate in Mexico. They propose a ‘neutral’ monetary policy so that 
the  central  bank  of  Mexico  responds  symmetrically  to  exchange  rate  movements  and 
thereby avoids bias toward over-valuation without fundamentally changing the inflation 
targeting framework.  In their own words, ‘the central bank would promote a competitive 
exchange  rate  by  establishing  a  sliding  floor  to  the  exchange  rate  in  order  to  prevent 
excessive  appreciation  (an  ‘asymmetric  band’…).  This  would  imply  intervening  in  the 
foreign exchange market at times when the exchange rate hits the floor (i.e., an appreciated 
exchange rate)  but allows the exchange rate to float freely otherwise.’ They point out that 
such a floor would work against excessive capital inflows by speculators because they 
would know that central bank will intervene to stop excessive appreciation. If need be, 
Galindo  and  Ros  also  proposed  temporary  capital  controls  (as  do  others  from  the 
PERI/Bilkent project) as a way of maintaining a stable and competitive real exchange rate. 
 




In the current crisis, excessive foreign borrowing has made some countries especially 
vulnerable to "sudden stops" in the flows of financial resources. 
 
 
21 This section draws heavily on Epstein and Grabel (2006), and Grabel (2003c).  
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One  way  of  dealing  with  such  problems  is  for  developing  countries  to  consider 
drastically reducing their reliance on foreign bank loans.  For example, policymakers could 
enforce strict ceilings on the volume of new foreign loans that can be incurred.  Such 
ceilings might involve strict limits on the allowable ratio of foreign to total loans, or might 
require that firms finance only a certain percentage of their projects with foreign loans that 
have a certain maturity and/or locational profile. 
 
Once the worst of the current crisis is over and a significant amount of capital flows 
resume, restrictions on foreign borrowing could be deployed dynamically as circumstances 
warrant, following the trip wire-speed bump approach.  Under this approach, policymakers 
monitor a trip wire that measures the economy’s vulnerability to the cessation of foreign 
lending.    This  involves  calculating  the  ratio  of  the  government’s  holdings  of  currency 
reserves  to  private  and  public  foreign-currency  denominated  debt  (with  short-term 
obligations  receiving  a  greater  weight  in  the  calculation).    If  this  ratio  approached  an 
announced  threshold,  policymakers  would  then  activate  a  graduated  speed  bump  that 
precluded new inflows of foreign loans until circumstances improved.  
 
Policy can also discourage--rather than prohibit--the use of foreign loans as a source 
of  finance.    Tax  systems  can  be  used  in  a  number  of  ways  to  discourage  domestic 
borrowers from incurring foreign debt obligations.  Domestic borrowers could pay a fee to 
the  government  or  the  central  bank  equal  to  a  certain  percentage  of  any  foreign  loan 
undertaken.  This surcharge might vary based on the structure of the loan, such that loans 
that involve a locational or maturity mismatch incur a higher surcharge.  Alternatively, the 
surcharge  might  vary  based  on  the  level  of  indebtedness  of  the  particular  borrower 
involved, such that borrowers who already hold large foreign debt obligations face higher 
surcharges  than  do  less-indebted  borrowers.    This  tax-based  approach  could  encourage 
borrowers to use domestic sources of finance since these would not carry any surcharge.  
Another strategy could involve varying the surcharge according to the type of activity being 
financed by foreign loans.  For instance, borrowers could be eligible for a partial rebate on 
foreign loan surcharges when loans are used to finance types of production that are highly 
employment intensive.    
 
To  the  extent  that  borrowers  assume  at  least  some  foreign  loan  obligations,  it  is 
imperative that the allocation and terms of these loans be managed by the government.  
Careful  management  of  the  allocation  of  foreign  debt  can  ensure  that  it  is  used  for 
productive, developmental purposes.  Prior to financial liberalization in the 1990s, many 
governments in East and Southeast Asia tightly coordinated allocation and access to foreign 
loans.  Until quite recently, policymakers in China and India maintained tight restrictions 
on foreign borrowing through a variety of means.   
 
In  general,  authorities  should  avoid  widespread  maturity  and  locational 
mismatches.  A  Maturity  mismatch  occurs  when  borrowers  finance  long-term 
obligations with short-term credit, leaving them vulnerable to changes in the supply 
and cost of credit. A  locational mismatch occurs when borrowers contract debts 
that  are  repayable  in  foreign  currency,  leaving  them  vulnerable  to  currency 
depreciation that increases the cost of debt service.   
 
In  addition  to  the  ceilings,  surcharges  or  approval  processes  discussed  above, 
policymakers can design trip wires and speed bumps that are designed to keep the levels of 
maturity and/or locational mismatch below the critical thresholds.  A trip wire for locational 
mismatch  is  the  ratio  of  foreign-currency  denominated  debt  to  domestic-currency 
denominated  debt  (with  short-term  obligations  receiving  a  greater  weight  in  the 
calculation).  A trip wire for maturity mismatch is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term 
debt  (with  foreign-currency-denominated  obligations  receiving  a  greater  weight  in  the 
calculation).  A  graduated series  of  speed  bumps  that  require  borrowers to  reduce  their  
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extent  of  locational  or  maturity  mismatch  would  be  implemented  whenever  trip  wires 
revealed the early emergence of these vulnerabilities.   
 
In cases where foreign loans have been significant, economic reforms that promote 
growth could replace the resources initially lost if there is a reduction in foreign borrowing 
due to the measures described above.   Governments and central banks that take steps to 
restrict  foreign  borrowing  can  replace  at  least  some  of  the  finance  that  is  forgone  by 
implementing measures that increase their ability to mobilize and channel domestic saving 
to projects that are central to a pro-poor growth agenda.. In this connection, measures that 
restrict the exit options of domestic savers and businesses would increase the pool of capital 
available domestically.  
 
There is a strong case for restricting the access of domestic savers to foreign capital 
markets.  The flight of domestic investors can induce financial instability, and reduce the 
tax base and the pool of domestic savings available for allocation by domestic financial 
institutions.  For these reasons, there is a strong case for restricting the ability of domestic 
investors to hold foreign savings accounts and engage in capital flight.  
 
There is plenty of evidence that when properly implement, management of inflows 
and outflows of portfolio investment can enhance the ability to undertake macroeconomic 
policy and help achieve developmental goals.  The success of blunt restrictions on portfolio 
investment  in  China,  India,  Chile  and  Colombia  suggest  that  foreign  investors  do  not 
necessarily shun countries with minimum-stay requirements on foreign investment or other 
types of capital management techniques.  We have also seen that the tax system can be used 
to influence the composition and/or maturity structure of international capital flows.  The 
potential for flight by domestic investors and savers can be reduced via implementation of 
exit taxes, prohibitions on flight, or restrictions on access to foreign currencies.  Finally, 
Malaysian experience suggests that speed-bump style management of portfolio investment 




To reiterate, there is extensive knowledge about the kinds of macroeconomic financial 
policies likely to protect national economies from the instabilities of global finance and 
achieve  their  goals  of  promoting  employment,  poverty  reduction  and  sustainable 
development. The main policy lessons are that:  
1.  central banks should implement a real targeting approach to monetary policy in order to 
facilitate the achievement of expansions in decent employment, enhance financial stability, 
and promote credit allocation to decent employment generating investments 
2.  Central  banks  should  develop  additional  tools  to  achieve  these  goals,  and  furthermore, 
should cooperate with other arms of government to bring about these results. Central banks 
cannot achieve these activities alone. They must coordinate with other key governmental 
and private actors.)  
3.  Market  allocation  of  finance  needs  to  be  embedded  in  strong  financial  regulations 
oftensupplemented by an important role for government guidance of finance to important 
sectors,  
4.  There  are  a  large  variety  of  successful  ways  to  use  the  financial  system  to  mobilize 
anddirect finance that make a judicious use of market incentives, government guarantees 
and monitoring to ensure that the finance goes to socially productive purposes and the poor  
5.  Central  banks,  along  with  other  public  financial  institutions  need  to  be  involved  in 
promoting a developmental role for finance , and  
6.  Capital management techniques, usually of a dynamic and flexible nature, can be a very 
important  tool  for  reducing  the  negative  aspects  of  global  financial  integration  while 
enhancing the positive aspects.   
  
33 
It  is  crucial  to  recognize  that  different  policies  are  likely  to  be  more  relevant  to 
countries at different levels of development. The "level of development" is likely to affect 
the choice of the appropriate mix of policies and policy institutions in a number of crucial 
ways: 1) Government capacity will have a big impact on the complexity and breadth of 
government management that a country can implement 2) The over-all degree income, 
wealth,  infrastructure  and  human  capital  will  obviously  affect  the  policy  priorities 
governments will need to pursue 3) the mixture of agriculture, manufacturing and services 
in  the  economy,    will  likewise  affect  the  transmission  mechanisms  of  monetary  and 
financial policy. These are just a few examples of the ways that "level of development" will 
play a crucial role in determining the available and useful policy options for particular 
countries. 
 
The overriding message of this paper is that a wide range of macroeconomic, financial 
policies and experiences do exist, that policymakers can draw upon and adapt in accordance 
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